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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Recent research has suggested
that labor markets may not be fully
competitive, meaning workers are
paid less than the value they add.
n We develop a new approach
to measuring and estimating
“markdowns”—the gaps between
wages and the value a worker adds—
in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
n Drawing on confidential survey
data on U.S. manufacturers, we find
that the typical worker at the average
manufacturing plant earns 65 cents
on each marginal dollar generated.
n The degree of monopsony
varies greatly across and within
manufacturing industries, with
markdowns generally higher for
larger and more productive plants.
n For U.S. manufacturing as a
whole, markdowns shrank between
1980 and 2000 but have risen
sharply more recently, suggesting
manufacturing workers are
increasingly underpaid relative to
their value.

For additional details, see see the full
working paper at https://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/364.

M
ost textbook economic models assume that labor markets are perfectly competitive.
In such a case, workers’ pay equals the marginal contributions to their employers’

revenues, or what economists call marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL). For
example, a worker who generates $20 more in employer revenues per hour should be
compensated $20 per hour. If an employer paid this worker less than that, the theory says
the worker could simply switch to another employer who is willing to pay slightly more
and still make a proft.
However, many researchers and policymakers have recently grown concerned that
the textbook model is not accurate and that employers’ market power over workers
has increased. Tis power could arise from ways in which employers may restrict their
workers from looking for other job opportunities, such as noncompete agreements
(Starr, Prescott, and Bishara 2021), a growing reluctance for workers to change locations
(Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2014), or business mergers that result in fewer employers
competing for workers (Prager and Schmitt 2021). However, it has been remarkably
challenging for researchers to fnd direct and general evidence on labor market power,
and this has complicated the policy debate. Te reason for this lack of evidence is simple:
While wages are observable in some data sets, frms’ MRPLs are hard to measure.
Without the latter, it is almost impossible to determine whether MRPLs are equal to
wages, as is predicted by perfect competition.
In a recent paper, we develop a new technique to show that employer market power
is substantial and widespread in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Using this approach,
we fnd that over the past several decades, a worker in the average manufacturing
plant receives only 65 cents on each dollar generated on the margin. Furthermore, we
construct a novel aggregate measure for labor market power, across all manufacturing
plants and workers in the United States, to understand how this phenomenon has
evolved over time. We fnd that employers’ market power actually decreased between the
late 1970s and the early 2000s, but that it sharply increased in the decade or so aferward.
Our study thus provides direct evidence that many workers are paid less than their “fair
share,” complementing earlier studies (as reviewed in Sokolova and Sorensen 2020)
which ofen relied on indirect methods. Despite recent gains in worker wages since the
pandemic, employer market power likely remains considerable.

Measuring Employers’ Labor Market Power
Under a perfectly competitive labor market, marginal gains in employer revenues
generated by workers should go fully to workers. Te intuition for this is straightforward:
Employers that don’t do this would see many or most of their workers depart to competitors.
Te presence of labor market power, on the other hand, implies that employers can
withhold some of these marginal gains. Hence, an employer with labor market power
compensates its workers with wage rates below their MRPLs. Typically, economists have
expressed labor market power through the gap (or ratio) between a frm’s MRPL and the
wages paid to workers, also known as the markdown.
Te main problem with measuring markdowns is that their components are ofen not
directly observable. MRPLs are never reported (and are, indeed, hard to measure), and
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An employer with
labor market power
compensates its workers
with wage rates below
the marginal revenue
they add.

even hourly wages are not always available, even in frm-level data. However, we show
that by making some relatively weak assumptions about a frm’s production function—
how it combines labor, capital, and other inputs to make products—we can estimate
plant-level markdowns. To do so, one requires a few additional pieces of information.
Te frst is the revenue share of each input (that is, the efective spending on that input
as a share of a plant’s revenues). Many frm-level data sets have revenue share of inputs
readily available, including the confdential Censuses of Manufacturing and Surveys of
Manufacturing we use for our analysis. Te second component needed is a measure of a
plant’s “output elasticities”—the percentage increase in physical output when a particular
input increases by 1 percent. Because these quantities are not available, we estimate them
using the rest of the data and a fexible form for a plant’s production function, adapted
from studies of industrial organization.
Tis “production function” approach also allows us to distinguish labor market
power from product market power. In other words, a frm or plant could both pay
workers below their MRPL (a wage markdown) and charge a price for its output product
above the competitive rate (a product markup). Our approach allows us to isolate wage
markdowns from product markups, an advantage over some other methods used to
estimate labor market power. Moreover, it allows us to characterize labor market power
for each plant (or frm) in the U.S. manufacturing sector.

Labor Market Power in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector
Te key takeaway from our main results, summarized in the table below, is that labor
market power is substantial for U.S. manufacturing plants. At the average plant, workers
Table 1 Estimated Plant-Level Markdowns in U.S. Manufacturing
Industry
Petroleum refning
Computers and electronics
Plastics and rubber
Food and kindred products
Paper and allied products
Chemicals
Lumber
Primary metals
Motor vehicles
Printing and publishing
Electrical machinery
Fabricated metals
Nonelectrical machinery
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Textiles
Furniture
Nonmetallic minerals
Apparel and leather
All manufacturing

Median

Mean

Typical range

0.42
0.44
0.55
0.57
0.59
0.62
0.65
0.69
0.73
0.74
0.76
0.80
0.80
0.83
0.83
0.87
0.88
0.97
0.73

0.39
0.39
0.52
0.52
0.56
0.55
0.62
0.67
0.70
0.67
0.71
0.76
0.76
0.80
0.79
0.86
0.82
0.87
0.65

0.26 – 0.78
0.28 – 0.67
0.40 – 0.76
0.37 – 0.92
0.41– 0.85
0.37 – 1.06
0.47 – 0.91
0.50 – 0.98
0.54 – 1.01
0.47 – 1.16
0.52 – 1.11
0.60 – 1.05
0.56 – 1.16
0.62 – 1.12
0.58 – 1.23
0.66 – 1.24
0.58 – 1.44
0.59 – 1.65
0.45 – 1.22

NOTE: The numbers shown represent the fraction of a dollar of revenue generated by workers that is paid in
wages at the median plant, the average plant, and in a range of plants within one standard deviation of the
mean, all for diferent manufacturing industries. If workers are paid their full value added, the value should be
1.00. Values below 1.00 thus represent wage markdowns. Values can be above 1.00 if workers are paid above
their revenue value added. The sample size underlying the estimates is approximately 1.4 million plant-year
observations. The industries shown approximately follow 3-digit NAICS categories. See the full paper for details
of the estimation strategy.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Annual Surveys of Manufacturing and Censuses of Manufacturing,
1976–2014.
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collect only 65 cents of every dollar they generate on the margin for their employers.
Because the distribution is skewed, the markdown at the median plant is not quite as
severe, but it still implies that half of plants pay their workers below 73 cents on the
dollar.
Labor market power is extensive across manufacturing industries, with the mean
(and median) plant paying wages less than MRPL in each industry. However, these
markdowns vary considerably across industries; they are greatest for plants in the
petroleum refning and the computer and electronics industries, and they are smallest in
the apparel and leather industry. Furthermore, markdowns also vary greatly within each
industry, as evidenced by the last column, which shows the middle range across plants.
While it is certainly plausible that industry-level factors (such as unionization rates) can
explain variation in markdowns, our results indicate that factors specifc to individual
plants can be important.1

Aggregate Trends in Labor Market Power
Te markdowns described above apply at the plant level over our whole sample period
of 1976 through 2014. As mentioned earlier, however, some policymakers and academics
have suggested that labor market power has increased over time for the whole economy.
Despite our markdown estimates by plant and year, it is not obvious how to combine
these plant-level measures to obtain a statistic that refects the aggregate economy—a
simple (or even weighted) average doesn’t quite work.
To calculate aggregate markdown, we note that plant-level markdowns are a function
of output elasticities and revenue shares. When we apply a similar logic to the aggregate
markdown, we can derive a specifc equation that properly weights the plant-level
markdowns, accounting for their diferences in output elasticities, revenue shares, and
total revenues. Tis equation for the aggregate markdown is fexible, in that it does not
depend on how plants are assumed to combine inputs to make a product, nor on any
particular mechanism for employer market power.
Applying this method, Figure 1 shows how the aggregate markdown for the U.S.
manufacturing sector has evolved over time. (We normalize the aggregate markdown in
the frst year, 1977, at a value of 1.00, with larger values intuitively representing increases
in employer market power.) Afer moderately declining in the late twentieth century, the
Figure 1 Aggregate Markdowns and Local Employment Concentration
1.15
Markdown/concentration (normalized)

Labor market power
is substantial for U.S.
manufacturing plants: on
average, workers collect
only 65 cents of every
dollar they generate on
the margin for their
employers.
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NOTE: The red line plots our measure of the aggregate markdown, normalized to have a value of 1.00 in 1977.
The turquoise line plots an aggregate of local labor market concentration, also normalized to have a value of 1.00
in 1977. Details of the construction of both measures are in the full paper (Yeh, Macaluso, and Hershbein 2022).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Censuses of Manufacturing, 1977–2012.
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Afer moderately
declining in the late 20th
century, the aggregate
markdown reversed
course, and employer
market power sharply
increased in the new
millennium.

aggregate markdown reversed course, and employer market power sharply increased in
the new millennium.
Because of the difculties of directly measuring markdowns, previous studies
have drawn conclusions on employers’ market power based on the concentration
of employment across frms. Concentrated labor markets—those with only a few
frms—naturally limit alternative employment options for workers, which could lead
to employers exercising their labor market power. Although this argument is attractive,
employer concentration does not necessarily lead to a wage markdown. Indeed, we fnd
that markdowns and concentration at the labor market level are only weakly correlated,
and that their time paths at the national, aggregate level also diverge, especially recently
(as illustrated by the turquoise line in Figure 1). Consequently, it is important to obtain
independent estimates of markdowns to draw meaningful conclusions about labor
market power.

Conclusion
Our recent research shows that labor market power is pervasive in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Workers are not fully compensated for their marginal contributions to their employers’ revenues. Instead, a worker at the average U.S. manufacturing plant receives only
65 cents for every dollar of revenue generated on the margin. While labor market power is
widespread, there is tremendous variation at plants both across and within industries.
Moreover, our aggregate measure of markdowns for the U.S. manufacturing sector as
a whole indicates that employers’ market power has switched course over time, falling
between the late 1970s and early 2000s but then sharply rising over the next decade or so.
Tis suggests that rising employer market power is unlikely to be the driver behind the
declining share of total income going to labor, which started its downward trend decades
earlier.
Note: Te views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.

Note
1. In the full paper (Yeh, Macaluso, and Hershbein 2022), we examine relationships between the
magnitude of markdowns and plants’ age, size, and productivity. While plant age and productivity
do not appear to be strongly related to the size of the markdown, plant size does. In particular, the
larger the plant in terms of its share of employment in the local labor market (defned by county
and industry), the higher the markdown. Intuitively, this should make sense: workers’ outside
options are more limited whenever the local labor market is controlled by only a handful of plants.
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